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Summary 
Policymakers around the globe have acknowledged that in various 
contexts corporations are able to control their employees more efficiently than 
public authorities. Accordingly, contemporary enforcement policies in various 
regulatory areas, including environmental, health and safety, and anti-bribery, 
seek to induce corporations to become “proactive partners,” rather than 
“enemies,” in the battle against law-breaking. Yet, a comparative analysis of 
contemporary regulatory enforcement policies reveals that policies adopted on 
both sides of the Atlantic follow different approaches in encouraging corporations 
to proactively ensure compliance by their employees. One end of the spectrum 
consists of deterrence-oriented policies, according to which corporations are 
closely monitored and harshly penalized for their employees’ misconduct, 
regardless of their efforts to ensure compliance. The other end of the spectrum 
consists of cooperation-oriented policies, which apply soft monitoring and impose 
no liability on corporations that implement compliance management systems. The 
middle of the spectrum is populated by various policies following mixed 
approaches, according to which regulatory monitoring is applied selectively, and 
liability is mitigated for corporations that implement compliance management 
systems. This multiplicity of regulatory enforcement policies raises the question: 
How should a regulatory enforcement policy be designed to efficiently induce 
corporate proactive compliance? This question, which has practical, academic, 
and political relevance, lies at the heart of this book.  
The study follows a law and economics approach in identifying a 
workable, innovative framework of enforcement policies that efficiently induces 
corporate proactive compliance with regulatory requirements. It analyzes the two 
major schools of thought regarding law enforcement, deterrence and cooperative 
approaches, and shows that neither of those comprises an optimal regulatory 
enforcement paradigm, from a social-welfare point of view. The analysis further 
suggests that various existing regimes that offer improved frameworks by 
combining different elements of the deterrence and the cooperative approaches are 
fraught with major pitfalls pertaining to information asymmetry and arbitrariness 
risks.  
Armed with the conclusions of the analysis thus far, the study takes on the 
challenge of developing a comprehensive enforcement framework that sustains 
the strengths of the existing regimes while coping with their pitfalls. The proposed 
framework is composed of two innovative policy components. First, a Third-
Party-Based Targeted Monitoring (TPTM) System, which hinges upon a voluntary 
regulatory program that uniquely incentivizes self-policing corporations to 
appoint stand-alone, professional corporate monitors. Thereby, the TPTM system 
induces self-policing corporations to distinct themselves from non-self-policing 
ones. Consequently, it enables enforcement authorities to credibly tailor 
monitoring efforts to different types of regulatees. Second, a Compound 
Corporate Liability Regime, under which corporations that self-report their 
employees’ misconduct incur a reduced sanction that mirrors the reduced social 
costs caused by the self-reported misconduct. Hence, the compound regime allows 
enforcement authorities to credibly tailor the sanctions imposed on differently 
motivated regulatees. These policy components, jointly and severally, enhances 
corporations’ motivation to proactively ensure compliance among their 
employees, while overcoming information asymmetry and arbitrariness pitfalls. 
Thereby, the proposed framework provides a generic, workable enforcement 
structure that may be implemented in a wide range of regulatory areas to 
efficiently induce corporate proactive compliance.  
 
 
